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This paper examines the proposition that general anti-avoidance 
rules achieve their purpose better when drafted in broad terms. 
Several jurisdictions have included misuse and abuse 
requirements in their GAARs in order to provide certainty and a 
high threshold for the GAAR’s operation. Others have enumerated 
their GAAR to add precision and certainty to its terms. While 
misuse and abuse requirements and enumeration have the 
appearance of adding precision to an uncertain area of law, in 
practice this is doubtful. The general anti-avoidance provisions 
of four jurisdictions are compared, namely Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. This article comes to two 
conclusions; that adding a misuse and abuse requirement to a 
GAAR does not significantly alter the substance of the inquiry; and 
that adding further details and precisions to a GAAR does more 
harm than good. These two conclusions promote the main 
proposition of this paper, that general anti-avoidance rules work 
best when drafted in broad terms. The international trend is 
heading towards more enumerated general anti-avoidance 
provisions; this paper aims to counter some of the arguments in 
favour of that trend. 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 13, 000 words. 
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The United Kingdom enacted a statutory general anti-avoidance 
rule, commonly known as a GAAR, on the 17th July 2013, just 
before this paper was written. The UK government took this step 
years, even decades, after many other countries and in so doing 
had the benefit of learning from international experience. It 
should therefore be telling that the UK chose specifically not to 
introduce a broad spectrum GAAR but rather a narrow, targeted, 
anti abusive avoidance rule. The United Kingdom also chose to 
include a list of legislatively enacted criteria for the courts to 
consider in their determination of abusive avoidance, rather than 
opting for more limited guidance as in New Zealand and Canada. 
In so drafting their GAAR, the government of the day surely had in 
mind some practical end different from that achieved in 
jurisdictions with a broadly drafted GAAR.  
  
 The function of a GAAR is to provide an all-encompassing 
provision to shield tax statutes from contrived and aggressive 
arrangements aimed at exploiting loopholes in a tax regime. A 
GAAR applies where an arrangement has satisfied the technical 
requirements of the law but is nonetheless an unacceptable 
arrangement. Because it is impossible for a parliament to predict 
every arrangement that a taxpayer might possibly carry out, it is 
necessary to have a broadly drafted rule, able to apply to 
innumerable situations concerning a multitude of highly technical 
specific provisions. However, there are several considerations 
which can pressure a government to enact a less broad GAAR than 
otherwise. The desire for certainty in the law is a compelling 
force that can influence a government to add precision and extra 
requirements to their GAAR.  
 This paper aims to examine what practical difference, if 
any, there is between the application in practice of a narrow anti-
abuse rule, a detailed rule, and a general general anti-avoidance 
rule.  
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 The comparisons in this paper serve to demonstrate two 
central points which in turn both contribute to one main 
proposition.  
1 An abuse/misuse requirement does not fundamentally alter 
the material inquiry under a GAAR; this is shown by 
comparing the approach of the courts under an anti-abuse 
rule to the approach under a broadly drafted rule  
2 Adding detail to a GAAR also does not fundamentally alter 
the inquiry and actually does more harm than good; this is 
shown by comparing the experience of Australia, whose 
provision is considerably detailed, to those jurisdictions 
with more broadly drafted GAARs such as New Zealand 
and Canada. This comparison also highlights some of the 
problems Australia has faced with their GAAR as a result 
of attempting to add precision to its terms. 
These two points both contribute to the central proposition of this 
paper that GAARs work best when drafted in broad terms. 
A The Comparators 
This paper compares four jurisdictions, namely, Australia, 
Canada New Zealand and the United Kingdom. All four of these 
jurisdictions enjoy a shared background, as part of the 
commonwealth and all operating as Common Law systems. Their 
shared background makes these jurisdictions make ideal 
comparators for this paper, as each originally adopted the Duke of 
Westminster principle,1 that taxpayers are free to construct their 
affairs to minimise tax. In this way, the tax avoidance 
jurisprudence in each jurisdiction is evolved from similar 
beginnings.2 Each jurisdiction has a statutory anti-avoidance 
provision, however every one of those provisions is drafted in 
  
1 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminster HL [1936] AC 1; 
applied in Australia: Anderson v Commissioner of Taxes (Vic) (1937) 57 CLR 
233; New Zealand Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd 
[1971] NZLR 641; and Canada Stubart Investments Ltd v The Queen [1984] 1 
SCR 536. 
2 Chris Atkinson “General Anti-Avoidance Rules: Exploring the Balance 
Between the Taxpayer’s Need For Certainty and the Government’s Need to 
Prevent Tax Avoidance” (2012) 14 Journal of Australian Taxation 1 at [7]. 
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different terms. The relevant provisions are; Part IVA in 
Australia,3 s 245 in Canada,4 s BG 1 and YA 1 in New Zealand,5 
and the s 207 in the United Kingdom.6 
 
 This paper undertakes several comparisons to demonstrate 
the two main points outlined above which contribute to the 
proposition that a GAAR achieves its purpose better when drafted 
in broad terms. The Canadian GAAR, which has been in place 
since 1988, contains a misuse and abuse requirement and has 
been subject to a great deal of judicial analysis. New Zealand’s 
provision is compared with Canada’s to examine whether a 
misuse/abuse requirement fundamentally alters the working of a 
GAAR. While the United Kingdom GAAR also contains a 
misuse/abuse requirement it had not been subject to any judicial 
analysis when this paper was written and thus its practical 
application can only be examined hypothetically. The 
comparisons here demonstrate that in substance the application of 
a broad GAAR is largely the same as a targeted anti-abuse GAAR 
because of the courts’ processes of interpretation and application. 
 
 The current Australian GAAR has been in place since 1981, 
and in appearance is very different to the others, simply because 
of its length. The Australian GAAR is a detailed provision, 
comparing it to Canada and New Zealand’s GAARs reveals that in 
this context detail brings complexity and that complexity can 
have undesirable consequences.  
 
II Background 
A The Rule of Law and Certainty 
The rule of law is a central pillar of democratic, fair and just 
government. 7  As such, arguments founded upon upholding the 
  
3 Part IVA Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (Austl.); 
4 s 245 Income Tax Act RSC 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended, (Can.); 
5 New Zealand s BG 1 and YA 1 Income Tax Act 2007 (NZ); and 
6 United Kingdom s 207 Finance Act 2013 (UK). 
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rule of law carry great weight and emotive prominence in any 
debate. While the exact content of the rule of law is subject to 
ongoing debate, the idea that a law must be relatively certain to 
satisfy the principles of the rule of law is less dubious.8 Deep 
analysis of the rule of law and the principle of certainty in the 
context of tax is not the focus of this paper; suffice it to say that 
the main criticism of GAARs is that they flagrantly violate the 
requirement that laws be certain. The catch-all nature of a GAAR 
and the countless forms of arrangements to which they must 
apply means even the most detailed GAAR will be broader than 
most legal rules. Indeed in a study directed at exactly this issue - 
whether a GAAR breaches the rule of law - the authors concluded 
that it does.9 
 
 A breach of certainty here is not simply philosophical 
rhetoric. It is often argued that because a general anti-avoidance 
rule is not certain it will have dampening effects on business and 
the economy, as taxpayers will be unable to plan their affairs in 
advance.10 The argument claims that because of its broad terms, 
taxpayers cannot know when their arrangement is one which may 
be subject to the GAAR. Thus, they are forced to choose between 
engaging in conduct and hoping for a favourable outcome or not 
undertaking the transaction at all.11  This line of argument has 
                                                                                                           
7 Thomas Carothers “The Rule of Law Revival” (1998) 77 Foreign Aff. 95 at 
[96]. 
8 Friedrich A Hayek The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge, London, 1960) at 
144; see also Adam Smith “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The 
Wealth of Nations (Encyclopedia Britannica, first published 1776, 1990) 405-
6, cited in British Columbia Railway v The Queen (1979) 79 DTC 5020, 5025, 
as cited in Atkinson at [9], on the important of certainty particularly in the 
setting of taxation. 
9 Rebecca Prebble and John Prebble “Does the Use of General Anti-Avoidance 
Rules to Combat Tax Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule of Law?” 2 
VUWLRP 8/2012 21. 
10 The importance of certainty in taxation is emphasised often, see Graham 
Aaronson QC GAAR Study (11 November 2011) at [3] and [5], and OECD 
Taxpayer’s Rights and Obligations: A Survey of the Legal Situation in the 
OECD Countries (OECD, 1990) at [2.21]; see also Adam Smith above n 8. 
11 Atkinson above n 2 at [55]. 
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dissuaded the United Kingdom government from introducing a 
statutory GAAR in the past,12 and is the primary reason for adding 
detail to a GAAR or ensuring a high threshold for its operation – 
through a misuse/abuse requirement.13  
 
 In Part VIII this paper explores the proposition that 
certainty is the wrong goal in the GAAR context. Nonetheless it is 
important to appreciate the weight placed on the certainty 
argument in order to understand why some jurisdictions have 
opted for more detailed GAARs, or GAARs with extra 
requirements. Enacting enumerated GAARs does not alter the 
inquiry adopted by the courts under a GAAR analysis and thus 
enumeration is not as beneficial as it may seem. Moreover, this 
paper concludes that enumeration can actually undermine the 
workings of a general anti-avoidance provision. 
B Uncertainty Is Necessary in the GAAR Context 
A general anti-avoidance rule must necessarily be a broad rule. 
The provision is tasked with countering arrangements which 
satisfy the specific provisions of tax statutes,14 yet aim to exploit 
loopholes in the legislation to obtain tax benefits in an 
unacceptable manner. They are backstop provisions made 
necessary by the highly complex content and form of tax law,15 
  
12 Judith Freedman “Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a 
General Anti-Avoidance Principle” (2004) 4 BTR 332, at [333]. 
13 See Graham Aaronson QC GAAR Study (11 November 2011), at [3] and [5] 
where the study group’s primary concern was certainty and the effect on the 
economy. 
14 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1986] 2 
NZLR 513 (CA) at [532] per Woodhouse P; cited with approval by the 
Supreme Court of New Zealand in Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
[2011] NZSC 95, [2012] 1 NZLR 433; [2010] NZCA 231, [2010] 3 NZLR 360 
at [47] (litigation known as Penny and Hooper); and see Westpac Banking 
Corporation v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2009] NZCA 24 at [184] 
15 Judith Freedman above n 12 at [342], see generally David A Weisbach 
“Formalism in the Tax Law” (1999) 66 The University of Chicago Law 
Review 860; and see Doreen McBarnet and Christopher Whelan “The Elusive 
Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control” (1991) 54 
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combined with the ingenuity and creativity of taxpayers who 
perpetually create new arrangements to use or circumvent 
technical tax provisions. 16  Even specific anti-avoidance 
provisions, enacted to counter specific forms of avoidance 
directly can be used or circumvented for the purpose of 
avoidance.17 Even when promoting a more targeted and detailed 
rule, Atkinson noted:18 
 
A GAAR will derive its effectiveness against 
unforeseen and unpredictable forms of tax avoidance 
by relying on broad terms and principles, and thus to 
define the outer limits of a GAAR with precision would 
likely render the provision ineffective. 
 
Tax avoidance is a hard-to-define area of law, ill suited to 
precise rules, and any attempt to counter avoidance in general 
will result in inevitable uncertainty. As the majority of the 
Supreme Court of Canada stated when enlarging the scope of the 
Canadian GAAR further than previous courts had been willing: 19   
 
[w]hile parliament’s intent is to seek consistency, 
predictability and fairness in the tax law, in enacting 
the GAAR, it must be acknowledged that it has created 
an unavoidable degree of uncertainty for taxpayers.  
 
In relying on broad terms and principles parliaments choose 
to leave it to the courts to flesh out the provisions and interpret 
and apply them to facts as they arise. Judges themselves have 
often criticised the level of judicial discretion needed under a 
                                                                                                           
The Modern Law Review 848, for an explanation of how technical and strict 
rules can cause loopholes in the law. 
16 Stubart Investments Ltd v The Queen [1984] (SCC) above n 1 at [66]. 
17 See for example, Lipson v The Queen (2009) DTC 5528, [2009] SCC 1 at 
[45] 
18 Atkinson above n 2 at [11]. 
19 Copthorne Holdings Ltd v Canada 2011 SCC 63, [2011] 3 SCR 721 at 
[123]. 
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GAAR inquiry, for example Kitto J in Newton when he stated that 
the then Australian GAAR was overdue for reform by someone 
who “will take the trouble to analyse his ideas and define his 
intentions with precision before putting pen to paper.”20 
Woodhouse P famously rejected these criticisms of the then New 
Zealand GAAR, in Challenge Corporation, stating:21 
 
It can be said … that inherent in the approach taken 
by Parliament is an assurance that some judicial 
misgivings as to the proper role of the Court 
concerning the earlier legislation have been 
misplaced. Most certainly it was open to Parliament to 
take this approach and I do not accept the view that 
any of the supposed problems of construing s 99 
should persuade the courts that they cannot be 
resolved by judicial interpretation and so must be left 
for yet further legislative attention. 
 
This view reflects the general approach of courts in each of 
the four jurisdictions now,22 as judges more readily accept their 
role under a GAAR inquiry.  
C Definitions 
Tax avoidance itself is an elusive concept. This is inherent in the 
fact that it refers to something that is technically legal, yet 
somehow unacceptable.23 A common and helpful starting point 
for any understanding of tax avoidance is its differentiation from 
  
20 Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1, 7 (PC); 
(1956) 96 CLR 577 (HC) at [597]. 
21 Challenge Corporation (CA) above n 14 at [534] 
22 See for example the approach of the Supreme Court of Canada in Copthorne 
above n 19; the approach of the High Court of Australia in Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation v Hart [2004] HCA 26; 217 CLR 216; and Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation v Spotless Services Ltd [1996] HCA 34; (1996) 186 
CLR 404.and the approach of the United Kingdom courts in developing and 
applying the judicial Ramsay principle to counter tax avoidance. 2 
23 Atkinson above n 2 at [3], see also above note 15 and accompanying text. 
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evasion.24 Evasion is illegal. It involves the willful attempt to 
reduce your tax liability, by fraudulent means.25 Tax avoidance is 
not illegal. Rather, it involves taking advantage of legally-
available tax-planning opportunities, in order to minimise ones 
tax liability.26  
 
A further line is drawn between acceptable and 
unacceptable tax avoidance. Defined broadly, avoidance would 
encompass all legal actions that have the effect of reducing, 
eliminating or deferring tax liability.27 Such a definition would 
include the simplest of business dealings, for example, merely 
incurring a deductible expense. Lord Wilberforce outlined the 
problem when dealing with the New Zealand GAAR in his 
dissenting judgment in Mangin in 1971,28 
 
It fails to specify the relation between the section and 
other provisions in the income tax legislation under 
which tax reliefs, or exemptions, may be obtained. Is 
it legitimate to take advantage of these so as to avoid 
or reduce tax? What if the only purpose is to use 
them? Is there a distinction between ‘proper’ tax 
avoidance and ‘improper’ tax avoidance? By what 
sense is this distinction to be perceived? 
 
The same conundrum presented itself to the House of Lords 
in Challenge Corporation, where Lord Templeman, speaking for 
the majority, famously drew the line by reference to a distinction 
between tax avoidance (to which the GAAR applied) and tax 
  
24 Judith Freedman “The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who Is Responsible? 
Governmental Influences and Corporate Social responsibility” in Jane Holder 
and Colm O'Cinneide (eds) Current Legal Problems 2006 (Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 359 at [362]. 
25 Black’s Law Dictionary 9th ed at at [1599]. 
26 Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed at [1599]. 
27 Atkinson, above n 2 at [4]; see Newton above n 20 per Fullager J at [646] 
and also Challenge Corporation (PC) above n 14 per Lord Aylmerton at 
[5,228]. 
28 Mangin v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1971] NZLR 591 (PC) at [602]. 
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mitigation (to which it did not).29 Also of note it the decision of 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal in the first BNZ case, where 
the majority drew the line between legitimate tax planning and 
improper tax avoidance.30 This terminological distinction has had 
its critics,31 however, with respect, this paper proceeds in 
agreement with President Cooke when he stated that the 
distinction is ‘both authoritative and convenient for come 
purposes’,32 and tax avoidance is used in this paper to mean that 
behavior which is unacceptable and subject to the GAAR, while 
mitigation refers to acceptable tax planning. 
D The Role of a GAAR 
When defined in this way, so as only to include unacceptable 
avoidance, avoidance is clearly an evil that should be 
combatted.33 Tax avoidance threatens the integrity of the tax 
system, reduces government revenue and undermines the equity 
of any tax regime.34 The crucial function of the GAAR is to draw 
the line between mitigation and avoidance. This paper proposes 
that because the GAARs in each jurisdiction require judicial 
interpretation and application, the substantive inquiry is similar in 
each country. The courts in each jurisdiction adopt a purposive 
approach and draw on indicative factors to aid their 
determination. It is this approach of the courts to a GAAR analysis 
that reveals how abuse/misuse requirements and detailed GAARs 
do not fundamentally alter the material GAAR inquiry.  
  
29 Challenge Corporation, above n 14 at [167] – [168] 
30 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd [2002] 1 NZLR 
450 (CA) [BNZ Investments No 1 (CA)] at [39]. 
31 Lord Hoffman, in MacNiven (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland 
Investments Ltd [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 AC 311at [257], and the majority of 
the Supreme Court in Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue [2008] NZSC 115, [2009] 2 NZLR 289 (‘Ben Nevis’) at [95]. 
32 Hadlee and Sydney Bridge Nominees Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
(1991) 13 NZTC 8, 116, at [8,122]. 
33 Atkinson, above n 2 at [5] and see OECD Secretary-General Report to the 
G20 Leaders (OECD, St Petersburg, 5-6 September 2013) at [2] and generally, 
which discusses the need to combat avoidance on an international level. 
34 Atkinson, above n 2 at [5]. 
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The following sections compare and assess the way the 
GAARs from the four jurisdictions distinguish between mitigation 
and avoidance. In finding that the material inquiry is the same in 
each case, and that enumeration tends to cause complications, the 
paper concludes that GAARs achieve their purpose better when 
drafted in broad terms. 
 
III Drawing the Line 
A Introduction 
The primary role of a GAAR, as mentioned, is to distinguish 
between avoidance and mitigation. This part of the paper briefly 
identifies the features common to all GAARs which are applied in 
the beginning stages of any GAAR analysis. 
B Basic Characteristics of All GAARs 
Generally, every GAAR requires that a taxpayer: 
1. undertakes an arrangement, scheme or transaction, that 
2. results in a tax benefit or advantage, where 
3. the obtaining of that tax benefit was a purpose of the 
taxpayer, the level of purpose required varies from not 
merely incidental to main or dominant. 
 
 The first two steps are largely definitional and the terms are 
drafted as broadly as possible in each of the four jurisdiction’s 
GAARs. Arrangement is defined broadly to ensure taxpayers 
cannot adopt a certain form of dealing to avoid the scope of the 
GAAR. Similarly, tax benefit is defined broadly to ensure that any 
alteration of ones liability to income tax can be subject to the 
GAAR provision. Broad definitions rather than drawing a line 
between mitigation and avoidance are aimed at providing all-
inclusive first steps to a GAAR inquiry.  
 
 All four GAARs also require a mental element of the 
arrangement; that the taxpayer had a purpose of obtaining the tax 
benefit. Here the GAAR analysis begins to draw the line as any 
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arrangement found to have only bona fide commercial purposes 
other than to obtain a tax advantage will not be caught by a GAAR. 
The New Zealand GAAR requires only that the tax avoidance 
purpose be not merely incidental to another purpose, while 
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom each require a 
stronger mental element.35 
Because Australia does not have a misuse/abuse requirement the 
courts have considered that the key to whether Part IVA applies 
lies in the purpose test.36 That approach combined with the detail 
of Part IVA has had some negative consequences in Australian 
jurisprudence which are discussed in Part XXX below.  
 
New Zealand, which also lacks a misuse/abuse 
requirement, has a judicially developed test to guide a GAAR 
inquiry known as the parliamentary contemplation test. Rather 
than emphasising the purpose of the arrangement the 
parliamentary contemplation test asks ‘whether the impugned 
arrangement, viewed in a commercially and economically 
realistic way, makes use of the specific provision in a manner that 
is consistent with Parliament’s purpose.’37 The courts in Canada, 
although dealing with a misuse/abuse requiring GAAR have, in 
substance, adopted a similar approach to New Zealand. The 
following part of this paper discusses these two approaches, and 




35 Australia s 177D ‘dominant purpose’ Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
(Cth) (Austl.); Canada s 245(3) ‘unless undertaken primarily for bona fide 
purposes’ Income Tax Act  1985 (Can), United Kingdom ‘main purpose’ s 207 
Finance Act 2013 (UK). 
36 Hart above n 22 at [92]; see also explanation in: Christine Barron, General 
Manager of Corporate and International Tax Division, Australian Treasury, 
“Anti-Avoidance Rules in Taxation: Striking a Balance” (speech to the Asian 
Tax Authorities Symposium, Kuala Lumpur, 4 September 2012) and Tax Laws 
Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance And Multinational Profit Sharing) 
Bill 2013 Explanatory Memorandum (Australia). 
37 Ben Nevis above n 31 at [109]. 
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IV Abuse and Misuse Requirements 
 
Because the Canadian GAAR (s 245) has been subject to 
judicial interpretation and application, it exemplifies how an 
abuse misuse/requirement works in practice. Upon examination 
and comparison with New Zealand’s broad rule, it seems that the 
Canadian GAAR works similarly to New Zealand’s.  
C Canada – The Comparison 
What is important to note here is that the comparison does not 
attempt to claim that the application of each GAAR is exactly the 
same, or that any case would be decided in exactly the same way. 
Rather, that the inquiry is not fundamentally altered as a direct 
consequence of the extra abuse and misuse requirement. In other 
words, given that the substantive inquiry and approach of the 
courts in their attempt to draw the line between avoidance and 
mitigation is similar in each case, it seems that the abuse 
requirement does not fundamentally alter where that line is to be 
drawn. Hence, the principle purpose of enacting a misuse 
requirement, to ensure certainty, is similarly achieved by each 
GAAR. The relevant text of the Canadian provision provides:38 
 
(4) The GAAR applies to a transaction only if it may 
reasonably be considered that the transaction, 
(a) would, if this Act were read without reference to 
this section, result directly or indirectly in a misuse 
of the provisions of any one or more of 
(i) this Act, the Income Tax regulations, 
(ii) the Income Tax Application Rules, 
(iii) a tax treaty, or 
(iv) any other enactment that is relevant in 
computing tax or any other amount payable by 
or refundable to a person under this Act or in 
determining any amount that is relevant for the 
purposes of that computation; or 
  
38 Income Tax Act 1985 (Can) s 245(4). 
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(b) would result directly or indirectly in an abuse 
having regard to those provisions, other than this 
section, read as a whole. 
 
The English wording is disjunctive, using misuse (in (a)) and 
abuse (in (b)), while the French wording is non-disjunctive using 
the one word l’abuse.39 The courts have overcome this apparent 
anomaly, preferring to engage in a single enquiry into whether 
the provisions have been misused or the Act abused having 
regard to the Act as a whole. 40 Much ink has been dedicated to 
this discrepancy over the years, however, for the purposes of this 
paper it is not of great consequence and thus it need not be delved 
into any further. 
 
This paper proposes that despite the disparity in wording, 
Canada’s provision and New Zealand’s provision, in practice, 
catch the same behavior. Upon examination of judicial 
interpretation and application of the two provisions one can easily 
see how they operate to affect the same kinds of behavior. What 
one can observe from this comparison is that an abuse 
requirement does not significantly alter the inquiry under a GAAR 
and does not change where the line will be drawn. In this way, 
the level of certainty under each GAAR must be the same. 
D The Approach 
The approach of the courts to section 245(4) was clarified and set 
out by the Supreme Court in Copthorne Holdings.41 The court 
held that the abuse or misuse inquiry requires a single two-stage 
test as follows: 
1. One must determine the object spirit or purpose of the 
provisions … that are relied on for the tax benefit, having 
regard to the scheme of the Act, the relevant provisions 
  
39 Canada Trustco Mortgage Co v Canada (2005) SCC 54 at [38] 
40 Canada Trustco at [39] 
41 Copthorne Holdings Ltd v Canada 2011 SCC 63, [2011] 3 SCR 721. 
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and permissible extrinsic aids,’42 this requires determining 
the rationale that underlies the words of the provision.43 
2. Then consider whether the transaction respects or 
frustrates this purpose.44 
 
If the transaction, so considered, either achieves an outcome 
that the provision was intended to prevent, or defeats the 
underlying rationale for the provision, or circumvents the 
provision in a manner that frustrates its object, spirit or purpose, 
it will constitute avoidance.45 The current New Zealand approach 
is, in substance, the same. As the Commissioner has outlined in 
his interpretation statement of 2013, the New Zealand approach is 
to:46 
1. Identify Parliament’s purpose for the particular provisions 
and then ask;  
2. Does the arrangement (viewed in a commercially and 
economically realistic way) use or circumvent the relevant 
provisions in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
identified purpose. 
 
Looking past the fact that the actual articulations of the tests 
differ, the essential inquiry is the same in sequence and 
substance. Both jurisdictions begin the examination by 
ascertaining the purpose of the relevant specific provisions. 
Subsequently, the courts must examine the facts and 
characteristics of the arrangement and decide whether the 
impugned arrangement is in line with the identified purpose, or 
instead goes against it.  
 
  
42 Copthorne above n 41 at [69]. 
43 Copthorne above n 41 at [69]. 
44 Copthorne above n 41 at [71]. 
45 Copthorne above n 41 at [72] 
46 Interpretation Statement: Tax Avoidance and the Interpretation of Sections 
BG 1 and GA 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007 (Public Rulings Unit, Office of the 
Chief Tax Counsel, 13 June 2013) at p 4 [17] and generally; Ben Nevis above n 
31 at [102], [103], [107], [108] [109] 
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Examples of judicial analysis from each jurisdiction are 
illustrative of the likeness. In Global Equity Fund Ltd Mainville 
JA found that the transactions were abusive of the relevant 
specific provisions.47 His Honour found that the fundamental 
rationale underlying the provisions is that, in order to be used for 
taxation purposes, business losses must be grounded in some 
form of economic or business reality. In light of that 
determination, the court held that the purpose of the provisions 
would be defeated if paper losses could be used to avoid the 
“payment of taxes otherwise owed on the profits resulting from 
the real world business operations of Global.”48 
 
The approach in the New Zealand case Alesco is remarkably 
similar to the approach in Global Equity. In the High Court Heath 
J analysed Parliament’s purpose and identified that the financial 
arrangements rules are intended to match real income and real 
expenditure.49 This observation, he stated, reflects the object of 
the specific provisions, namely, to “prevent deferring income and 
advancing expenditure.”50 The Court of Appeal also concluded 
that the word expenditure in the specific provisions required an 
actual outflow of money or an obligation to make a payment.51 
The court held that the features of the financial arrangements 
rules suggested Parliament would not have intended for the rules 
to be used to claim interest deductions for which the taxpayer was 
not liable or did not pay.52 Here, the court followed the same 
approach as in Equity, by identifying the purpose of the specific 
provisions and testing the impugned transaction against that 
purpose in light of the economic reality. 
  
47 The Queen v Global Equity Fund 2013 DTC 5007 [5226], 2012 FCA 272 at 
[62] specific provisions in question were: Sections 3, 4, 9, and 11 of the 
Income Tax Act (Can). 
48 Global Equity Fund 2013 DTC 5007 [5226], 2012 FCA 272 at [66]-[68]. 
49 Alesco New Zealand Limited and Ors v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
[2013] NZCA 40 (HC No 2) at [105] (emphasis in original). 
50 Alesco (HC) above n 49 at [105], referring to s EH 20 of the Income Tax Act 
51 Alesco (CA) above n 49 at [70]. 
52 Alesco (CA) above n 49 at [71] and [72] 
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In each case the court found in favour of the Commissioner as 
specific provisions had been used outside their intended scope. 
 
Interestingly, this approach to a GAAR provision seems to be 
taken even further in the country with an abuse and misuse 
requirement. In Inter-Leasing Inc (a Canadian case), 53 Aston J 
identified the purpose of the provisions broadly, significantly 
opening up the possibility for their abuse.54 His Honour held that 
the purpose of the specific provisions was to raise revenue. Thus, 
because the transactions sought to avoid the charging provision, 
they were contrary to its objective and therefore abusive. His 
Honour went on to hold:55 
“A charging provision is not aimed at encouraging 
or discouraging certain taxpayer decisions or 
behavior. The purpose, plain and simple, is to raise 
revenue. As a charging provision, the purpose of s 
2(2) of the OCTA … is to define the tax base as 
broadly as possible in order to generate tax. 
As a consequence, it will be very difficult to find 
that any ‘tax benefit’ resulting from an ‘avoidance 
transaction’ is consistent with the ‘object spirit and 
purpose’ of this category of legislative provision. It 
seems unlikely there will be any underlying policy 
choice by the legislator that will afford refuge for 
the taxpayer under the third [i.e. abuse] part of the 
analytical framework.” 
Here Aston J has drawn the line for arrangements that will 
constitute avoidance, and despite the presence of a misuse/abuse 
requirement, has provided a very low threshold for the operation 
of s 245. 
 
  
53 Inter-Leasing Inc v Ontario (Revenue) 2013 ONSC 2927, at [41]-[43] 
54 Inter-Leasing Inc, at [41]-[43] 
55 Inter-Leasing Inc, at [42]-[43]. 
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V Central Objection to the Approach in Canada and 
New Zealand: 
A The Objection 
The objection most often levied against the approach taken by the 
Canadian and New Zealand courts to GAAR analysis is that it is 
little more than a rule of construction and takes us no further than 
a purposive interpretation. 
 
Purposive interpretation is an accepted and common 
approach to statutory construction.56 It involves “interpreting 
specific provisions in accordance with the object or purpose of 
the provisions as construed from the words used in their wider 
context.”57  If an arrangement is designed and carried out in a 
manner inconsistent with the object and purpose of the particular 
provisions, then shouldn’t a purposive interpretation be enough to 
deny that arrangement? A central feature of the GAAR is that the 
impugned arrangements satisfy the technical requirements of the 
specific provisions in question,58 once this has been established a 
GAAR analysis may be begun. Therefore, there seems to be an 
anomaly if an arrangement satisfied a specific provision 
purposively construed, yet was then found to frustrate the 
purpose of the arrangements under a GAAR analysis. In other 
words, under the two-step tests outlined above, the GAAR really 
takes us no further than a purposive approach to statutory 
construction. However, the next section explains that a gear 
  
56 See Interpretation Act 1999 (NZ) s 5; Barclays Mercantile Business Finance 
Ltd v HM Inspector of Taxes, [2004] UKHL 51; [2005] STC 1, at [32]; IRC v 
McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991, per Lord Steyn at 1000, and Lord Cooke at 
1005, explaining the Ramsay principle; Copthorne above n 41 at [70] Citing 
Canada Trustco above n 39 at [47]; Austin v The Commonwealth (2003) 51 
ATR 654, at [723????]; and Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA 
57 Atkinson above n 2 at 42; see also Interpretation Act 1999 s 5 (NZ). 
58 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1986] 2 
NZLR 513 (CA) at [532] per Woodhouse P; cited with approval by the 
Supreme Court of New Zealand in Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
[2011] NZSC 95, [2012] 1 NZLR 433; [2010] NZCA 231, [2010] 3 NZLR 360 
at [47] (litigation known as Penny and Hooper). 
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provision provides for a broad inquiry and allows courts to go 
further than they would under a simple purposive construction. 
 
B The limits of the purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation 
While the purposive approach is an accepted modern approach to 
interpretation and is regularly used by judges in many areas of the 
law, it still has, and always will have, its limits.  
 
The purposive approach is inherently limited, and judges, 
warning against judicial law making, frequently stress those 
limits. Indeed, when concluding in favour of the taxpayer in the 
United Kingdom case Jones, Carnwath LJ expressed that “The 
lack of a clearly ascertainable legislative purpose underlines the 
need for caution.”59 Courts are still limited to the words of the 
statute, as Lord Hoffman has emphasised, the intention of 
Parliament can be expressed only through statute, and it is the 
words of that statute, as interpreted by the courts, that embodies 
the intention.60 Tokeley outlines two limits to the purposive 
approach.61 First, it should only be applied where the words of 
the statute are uncertain,62 where a literal approach will not 
suffice. Secondly, it can only be used to employ a meaning that 
the words of the statute are reasonably capable of bearing.63  
 
While these limits are easily referred to, they are complex in 
practice. When can it be said that a word’s meaning is uncertain? 
At what point does a meaning become one that the word cannot 
  
59 Jones v Garnett [2007] UKHL 35; [2005] EWCA 1553; [2005] EWHC 849 
(Ch) (CA) at [108]. 
60 Lord Hoffman, “Tax Avoidance” (2005) British Tax Review 197, 204 
CHECK; see also Lord Hoffman in Auckland Harbour Board (2001) 20 NZTC 
17, 008, at [2], [4], [5], [6], [8], [9], and [11]. 
61 Kate Tokeley “Interpretation of Legislation: Trends in Statutory 
Interpretation and the Judicial Process” (2002) 33 VUWLR 965 at [969]. 
62 Kate Tokeley, at [969]. 
63 Ibid. 
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reasonably bear?64 Significantly, when these difficulties come to 
bare, courts may and often do err on the side of caution. As 
Iacobucci J stated of the approach in Canada, in qualifying his 
own endorsement of the modern purposive approach: 
 
“[T]his Court has also often been cautious in 
utilizing tools of statutory interpretation … it would 
introduce intolerable uncertainty into the Income 
Tax Act if clear language in a detailed provision of 
the Act were to be qualified by unexpressed 
exceptions derived from a court’s view of the object 
and purpose of the provision.”65  
 
Moreover, a purposive approach alone will often fail to 
produce a unified approach. Goldberg QC noted that in the 
United Kingdom under the judicial Ramsay Principle and a 
purposive approach, most of the cases that broadened the Court’s 
role in stopping tax avoidance were followed by another case, 
which narrowed the role.66  
 
Nonetheless, it has been argued that in order to go further 
than purposive interpretation a GAAR needs both an abuse 
requirement and a legislated list of criteria that indicate abusive 
avoidance.67 For many decades the United Kingdom courts have 
continued to develop and apply a judicial shield against tax 
avoidance, known as the Ramsay principle,68 which asks whether 
  
64 See Tokeley, above n 61.  
65
 65302 British Columbia Ltd v The Queen [2000] 1 CTC 57, SCC at [79]-
[80] 
66 David Goldberg “The Approach of the Acourts to Tax Planning Schemes” 
Taxbar 
<http://www.taxbar.com/documents/Approach_Courts_David_Goldberg.pdf> 
67 Atkinson above n 2, a paper written in the stages leading up to the 
introduction of the United Kingdom’s GAAR at [56]. 
68 First propounded in W T Ramsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners 
[1982] AC 300. 
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‘the relevant statutory provisions, construed purposively, were 
intended to apply to the transaction, viewed realistically.’69 
 
Given the strength of this judicial principle, the United 
Kingdom government may have been concerned to ensure their 
GAAR went further than a purposive approach, which may also 
explain the adoption there of a detailed gear. This paper proposes 
that the GAAR analyses in both New Zealand and Canada do in 
fact go beyond purposive construction, and thus legislated details 
are neither necessary nor desirable. 
C The Ramsay Principle versus a GAAR analysis 
Comparisons in this area are difficult. In order to 
demonstrate that the New Zealand GAAR, for example, has a 
broader reach than the purposive approach of the United 
Kingdom courts, one would ideally compare a case from each 
jurisdiction, with exactly the same facts, in a setting of exactly 
the same income tax laws, but for the presence of a GAAR. This, 
unfortunately, is impossible. We are forced to hypothesise.  
Income splitting or shifting provides a good setting for a 
comparison because the facts are more easily understood than 
other avoidance cases, which often involve highly complex 
financial concepts and arrangements. Briefly, income shifting is 
where income is allocated or shifted to a taxpayer with a lower 
tax rate, or with losses to use, and deductions or credits are 
allocated to those in higher tax brackets.70  
Jones v Garnett (Inspector of Taxes)
71 is an income splitting 
case from the United Kingdom. The taxpayer (Mr Jones) 
established a company with his wife for his computer consultancy 
business, each spouse bought one share for £1 each. Mr Jones 
generated all the income for the company, and his wife provided 
some administrative services for which she was paid a fair 
  




71 Jones v Garnett above n 59. 
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salary.72 Mr Jones however, received a salary ‘plainly less’ than 
he could have earned in the market.73 This set-up allowed the 
company to earn profits and distribute them as dividends to each 
shareholder. The dividend payable to Mrs Jones was taxable at a 
lower rate than it would have been if it had been added to the 
income of Mr Jones,74 or if he had received a realistic salary. The 
structure resulted in a lower overall tax liability for the couple. 
The House of Lords, however, found in favour of the taxpayer.  
The New Zealand case of Penny v CIR75 (also known as 
Penny and Hooper) provides a good comparator. The case 
involved two orthopaedic surgeons who each incorporated their 
practices, those companies being owned by family trusts. The 
taxpayers became employees of those companies and, as in 
Jones, their work represented all the earning power of the 
companies. Although continuing business much as they had 
before, after establishing their companies, the taxpayers earned 
substantially lower salaries. The balance of the income not paid 
out as salary was taxed at the company rate of 33%, rather than 
the 39% tax rate the salaries would have been subject to. 
Importantly, in each case the taxpayers continued to enjoy the use 
and control of the earnings much as they would have, if the profit 
been paid directly as salaries. The Supreme Court of New 
Zealand found in favour of the Commissioner and held that the 
arrangements were tax avoidance and void against the 
Commissioner for tax purposes. 
This paper proposes that had Jones been tried in New 
Zealand, the scheme would have been found to be tax avoidance. 
The characteristic of the arrangement that so offended the 
Commissioner in Penny and Hooper, was the fixing of the 
salaries at such an artificially low level. That element also lead to 
the court’s finding of a tax avoidance purpose and ultimately to 
its finding of tax avoidance. In both cases public interest spiked 
  
72 Jones v Garnett at [4] 
73 Jones v Garnett at [4]. 
74 Jones v Garnett at [5]. 
75 Penny above n 58. 
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because of the so-called ordinary nature of the structures,76 a 
factor that was not overlooked by the Supreme Court:77 
The structure both taxpayers adopted when they 
transferred their businesses to companies owned by their 
family trusts was, as a structure, entirely lawful and 
unremarkable. 
 
However, the artificial fixing of the salaries was enough to 
indicate the purpose of the arrangement and to conclude it was 
tax avoidance.78 An artificially low salary was also present in 
Jones. Furthermore, the court found that Mr Jones’s decision to 
set up his company as he did was ‘tax driven and not 
commercially driven,’79 an important factor under the New 
Zealand BG 1 inquiry.80  
Admittedly, there were certain provisions in play in the 
Jones case, such as a specific anti-avoidance rule and a relevant 
exception to it.81 In fact, the Ramsay principle was only briefly 
mentioned in the House of Lords judgment and was not referred 
to in the lower courts. Why was the principle not argued by the 
Inspector? Perhaps the presence of a specific anti-avoidance rule 
was seen as excluding the operation of the principle? Whatever 
the reason, had the case been a New Zealand one, the GAAR 
would not have been overlooked as Ramsay was. It would have 
  
76 James Bailey, August 2007 http://www.taxinsider.co.uk/231-







77 Penny and Hooper above n 58 at [33] 
78 Penny and Hooper above n 58 at [34]-[36] and [47]-[48] 
79 Jones above n 59 at [10]. 
80 s BG 1 and YA 1 Income Tax Act 2007 (NZ). 
81 Chapter IA of Part XV of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 
(UK), specifically ss 660A and 660G. 
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been invoked to counter the arrangement, and it would have 
succeeded as it did in Penny.  
 
This conclusion is based on a number of considerations. 
Firstly, the elements of the arrangement that were emphasised by 
the Supreme Court in Penny as leading to their decision were also 
present in Jones (the presence of artificiality, seen in the 
artificially low salary, and the fact that Mr Jones still enjoyed the 
benefit of the profit). Secondly, it is well established in New 
Zealand that the presence of a specific anti-avoidance provision 
does not prevent the application of the GAAR,82 thus the presence 
of the specific anti-avoidance rule in the United Kingdom would 
not have prohibited the operation of the GAAR. Finally, as 
mentioned, the courts found a purpose of tax avoidance in Jones, 
an element essential and telling under a GAAR inquiry.  
 
Now that it has been established that the Canadian and New 
Zealand GAAR inquiries are in substance the same, and that they 
both go further than a purposive approach and the Ramsay 
principle of the United Kingdom, the paper turns to consider 
United Kingdom’s s 207. 
 
 
VI The United Kingdom – An Enlightened GAAR? 
 
The benefit of comparing and examining the United Kingdom 
GAAR is that it was adopted much later than the other three 
GAARs. As such, the United Kingdom had the advantage of 
learning from international experience,83 and was able to choose 
  
82 Challenge above n 58 at [559]; and Penny above n 58 at [48]. See also 
Interpretation Statement of the Commisisoner 2013 above n 46 at p 17 [67]-
[71]. 
83 Judges on the advisory panel were specifically chosen for their experience 
with GAARs from different jurisdictions, Graham Aaronson QC GAAR Study 
(11 November 2011) at [11]. 
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what seemed to be the most effective aspects of various GAARs.84 
Examining the end result in the form of s 207, and the report that 
led to it,85 highlights where the United Kingdom government’s 
concerns lie and how its chosen GAAR might address those 
concerns. It is important to understand the concerns the United 
Kingdom government had when contemplating the introduction 
of their GAAR, as these concerns shed light on the advantages the 
United Kingdom Parliament attribute to the abuse requirement 
and therefore the matters we must measure a broader GAAR by to 
see if it comes short. 
 Analysing s 207 in light of the approaches in other 
jurisdictions it is hard to conclude that the enumerated United 
Kingdom rule really transforms the GAAR inquiry. 
A The Aaronson Report 
The Aaronson report is the product of a Treasury 
commissioned inquiry,86 led by Aaronson QC, and it is that report 
which provided the basis of what was eventually enacted, in the 
form of section 207. The issue to be considered was complex, 
requiring an overall analysis to decide whether introducing a 
GAAR would be a positive step for the United Kingdom. The 
inquiry was not simply asking whether a GAAR could be used to 
counter avoidance, but whether, considering all factors, any 
positives outweighed the negatives.  
 
The ‘most critical’ factor was whether a GAAR would make 
the United Kingdom a less attractive place for business and 
investment,87 other factors included ensuring sufficient certainty, 
and avoiding undue compliance costs for businesses and 
individuals. Ultimately, these factors led to the rejection of a 
broad-spectrum general anti-avoidance rule. The report stated a 
  
84 Judith Freedman “GAAR: challenging assumptions” (27 September 2010) 
Tax Journal < http://www.taxjournal.com/tj/articles/gaar-challenging-
assumptions> 
85 s 207 Finance Act 2013 (UK); and Aaronson Report above n 13. 
86 Aaronson Report above n 13. 
87 Aaronson Report above n 13. 
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broad GAAR would carry a ‘real risk of undermining the ability of 
business and individuals to carry out sensible and responsible tax 
planning’.88 Interestingly, the phrase responsible tax planning 
was used multiple times throughout the report, with continuing 
claims that a more moderate rule targeted at abusive avoidance 
would have the benefit of not applying to the centre ground of 
responsible tax planning.89 This paper proposes that such a 
distinction is, with respect, ill founded. It is clear that no GAAR, 
broad or otherwise, is aimed at affecting the centre ground of 
responsible tax planning. There are several possible reasons for 
the Report’s use of this phraseology.  
 
Possibly, the phrase reveals that the targeted GAAR is 
intended to affect all unacceptable avoidance, as long as it does 
not fit into the centre ground of responsible planning, in which 
case it is targeted, from its very inception, at the same behavior as 
a broad-spectrum GAAR such as New Zealand’s or Australia’s, 
which target unacceptable avoidance without using an ‘abuse’ 
threshold. Here, each GAAR is intended to draw the line in the 
same place.  
 
Another possibility is that the report has chosen to refrain 
from admitting that a substantial number of undesirable 
avoidance arrangements will fall outside of the scope of the anti-
abuse rule. Here, the bulk of arrangements that may lie between 
abusive and responsible are left unaffected. Under this scenario, 
perhaps we see why the guidelines made explicit the intention to 
keep the judicial Ramsay principle alive and well - to ensure any 
behavior that is unacceptable, yet short of abusive, still can and 
will be countered.90 
  
88 Aaronson Report, above n 13 at [3]. 
89 Aaronson Report, above n 13 - more than fifteen times at [4], [5], [6], [7], 
[9], [28], [30], [32], [34] and [40]. 
90 W T Ramsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1982] AC 300 (HL) 
and HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC’s GAAR Guidance) (15 April 2013) 
(United Kingdom) at [B8.3]. 
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The use of such phraseology could also imply the study 
group and ultimately the government feels that a broad-spectrum 
GAAR, which lacks an abuse requirement, does in fact affect the 
centre of responsible tax planning. In other words, after careful 
assessment of international experience and considering potential 
practical examples within the United Kingdom context, the study 
group decided that a broad-spectrum GAAR would catch and 
affect responsible tax planning. This view is shared by many, 
often from the finance and business worlds, who refer to the 
planning behavior as responsible business. 
 
With respect, this paper disagrees. General anti-avoidance 
rules, broad or otherwise, have the common chief aim of leaving 
untouched ordinary business and family tax planning. Hence, the 
New Zealand Commissioner’s continued acceptance that a literal 
application of the GAAR is undesirable, as it would affect much 
more than is desirable.91  
 
Reactions to certain cases won by the Commissioner over the 
years reveal that the view that GAARs encroach on acceptable 
planning is alive and well. For example, several people from the 
tax planning industry viewed the recent decision in Alesco as a 
step too far.92 However, the same reactions followed many other 
avoidance cases when their judgments were laid down in favour 
of the Commissioner, such as Penny and Hooper. While some 
may always hold the view that a line is being crossed and the 
commercial world is suffering unjustifiably, it seems the Revenue 
Department and the government do not agree. The government 
has had every opportunity to amend or qualify the broad 
spectrum BG 1 provision. However, it has chosen not to. Nor 
  
91 Interpretation Statement of the Commissioner above n 46 at [11]-[12], see 
also Challenge above n 58 at [532] and [541]; Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd [2002] 1 NZLR 450 (CA) [BNZ Investments 
No 1 (CA)] at [41]. 
92 Alesco above n 49. 
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have the Australian or Canadian governments. Indeed, Australia’s 
government has amended Part IVA to broaden its scope.  
 
B The Double Reasonableness Test 
The Guidelines issued by the HMRC describe the double 
reasonableness test as the crux of the GAAR test, and the feature 
that provides ultimate taxpayer protection.93 The test is the most 
unique aspect of s 207, and as such it is analysed to see what 
changes it could make to a gear inquiry. 
  
The test does not ask whether entering into or carrying out 
the arrangements was a reasonable course of action in relation to 
the relevant tax provisions. In stead, it asks whether there can be 
a reasonably held view that entering into or carrying out the tax 
arrangements in question was a reasonable course of action.94 
 
The test is meant to recognise that there are some 
arrangements which some people would regard as reasonable, 
while others would not.95 Given that recognition, the judge is 
required to consider the range of reasonable views that could be 
held in relation to the arrangements.96 In this way, the double 
reasonableness test seems to lift the threshold for what will be 
found to be abusive avoidance. However, the double 
reasonableness inquiry is qualified in the legislation, which 
states: 
 
(2) “Tax arrangements are “abusive” if they are arrangements 
the entering into or carrying out of which cannot reasonably 
be regarded as a reasonable course of action in relation to the 
relevant tax provisions, having regard to all the 
circumstances including –  
  
93 HMRC Guidelines above n 90, at p 24 [C5.10.1} 
94 HMRC Guidelines above n 90 at p 24 [C5.10.1] 
95 HMRC Guidelines above n 90 at p 10 [B12.2] 
96 HMRC Guidelines above n 90, emphasis added. 
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(a) whether the substantive results of the arrangements 
are consistent with any principles on which those 
provisions are based (whether express or implied) and 
the policy objectives of those provisions, 
(b) whether the means of achieving those results involves 
one or more contrived or abnormal steps, 
(c) whether the arrangements are intended to exploit any 
shortcomings in those provisions.97 
 
The guidelines further emphasise this qualification by stating 
“It is necessary to test any given view to see whether that view 
itself can be regarded as reasonable, having regard to the 
purposes of the GAAR legislation and the factors that it requires to 
be taken into consideration.”98 The guidelines claim that this 
qualification recognises that some people hold extreme views. 
The United Kingdom GAAR is based on the premise that taxation 
is the principal means by which the necessary functions of the 
state are funded, and its basic purpose is to deter or counteract 
deliberate exploitation of the legislation.99 Therefore, someone’s 
view, if based on some other proposition, such as a belief that 
people are free to exploit any shortcomings in tax legislation, will 
be unreasonable for the purposes of the GAAR. 
 
So, while the double reasonableness test appears, at first 
instance, to raise the threshold for abusive avoidance, upon closer 
analysis, it test against the approach of the courts in New 
Zealand. Harrison J in Westpac, after identifying the purpose of 
the foreign tax regime, took the view that Parliament would have 
expected foreign tax to actually have been paid. At [612]  
 
“As demonstrated by s LC 1(3A), the FTC regime was 
intended to provide New Zealand taxpayers with 
credits for tax paid in a foreign jurisdiction … I accept, 
as Wild J did, the Commissioner’s argument that the 
  
97 Finance Act 2013 (UK) s 207(2), (emphasis added). 
98 HMRC Guidelines, above n 90 (emphasis added). 
99 HMRC Guidelines above n 90 at p 25 [C5.10.5] – [C5.10.6]. 
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actual payment of foreign tax is the policy foundation 
of the FTC regime and that, without such a payment, 
there is nothing against which to allow a credit.” 
 
As we have seen, this is the same approach of the Canadian 
courts - to identify the purpose of the particular provision and 
then see if the arrangement contravenes that purpose. Is it 
possible that, under the double reasonableness test, a different 
outcome would result? It seems that in a world of possibilities it 
could reasonably be regarded as a reasonable course of action to 
gain a foreign tax credit when no foreign tax had been paid. Tax 
legislation is extremely complex, and the commercial 
environment is increasingly competitive in the global economy. 
Given the widely held view that there is no dichotomy between 
tax avoidance and commercial decision making, there could be a 
reasonably held view that the Westpac scheme was a reasonable 
course of action for a commercially competitive enterprise.  
 
However, if a reasonably held view for the purposes of the 
GAAR must be premised on the underlying rationale of the GAAR, 
the range of reasonably held views is fundamentally limited. To 
adopt Harrison J’s approach above, in light of the words of the 
United Kingdom test: if regard must be had to the substantive 
results of the arrangements (the obtaining of a foreign tax credit), 
and to whether those results are consistent with the principles 
upon which the provisions are based and the policy objectives of 
the provisions (to provide a tax credit for tax paid in a foreign 
jurisdiction), then a view that obtaining a foreign tax credit where 
no foreign tax had been paid it seems cannot be a reasonably held 
view in relation to the GAAR. Rather, it is based on the idea that it 
is acceptable to exploit shortcomings in the legislation, and thus 
is abusive tax avoidance under the double reasonableness test. 
 
 
VII The Broadened Inquiry – Factors Courts Consider 
Parts IV and V above outlined the general approach of the 
Canadian and New Zealand courts, and the idea that under the 
Victoria University LAWS 516 Taxation Research Paper “When It Comes to General Anti-
Avoidance Rules, Is Broader Better? 
 
34
gear a court’s analysis goes further than a mere purposive 
approach. This part of the paper explores the idea that a gear 
inquiry is broader than ordinary statutory construction. It is this 
concept – a broadened inquiry – and the substance of that inquiry 
that reveals the similarities of the workings of each GAAR, 
because under a broad inquiry the courts in each country look to 
indicative factors to aid their determination. 
A How the Inquiry Is Broadened 
1 A purpose of tax avoidance becomes justifiably relevant 
Most obviously, the general anti-avoidance rules in each 
jurisdiction make the having of a tax avoidance purpose, or the 
purpose of gaining a tax benefit, relevant.100 Indeed, in Australia 
it is well established that the fulcrum upon which Part IVA turns 
is whether a person or persons who participated in the scheme did 
so for the sole or dominant purpose of gaining the identified tax 
benefit. 101  
A taxpayer’s subjective intention is not relevant to a finding 
of tax avoidance, rather it is the objective purpose of the 
arrangement as identified through a wide analysis of all aspects 
of the arrangement.102 In this way, the inquiry into purpose 
invites a consideration of indicative factors, which in turn 
contribute to a conclusion on whether the arrangement is a tax 
avoidance arrangement. Part IVA of Australia lists eight 
objective indicia to be considered when answering the question of 
purpose.103  
  
100 s 245(3) Income Tax Act (Can.); s 177D Income Tax Assessment Act 
(Austl.); s BG1 (1) Income Tax Act (NZ); and s 207(1) Finance Act 2013 
(UK). 
101 Callinan J in Hart above n 22 at [92]; endorsed by Tax Laws Amendment 
(Countering Tax Avoidance And Multinational Profit Sharing) Bill 2013 
Explanatory Memorandum (Australia).at [1.71] and [1.125]. 
102 See; Ontario Ltd v The Queen 2012 FCA 259; HMRC Guidelines above n 
90 at p 16 [C3.3]; Hart above n 22 at [37] and [86]; and Glenharrow Holdings 
Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2008] NZSC 116, [2006] 2 NZLR 359 
at [38] and Ben Nevis above n 31 at [102]. 
103 Income Tax Assessment Act s 177D (Austl.) 
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This leads to the second aspect of the broadened inquiry, the 
substantive analysis and the factors considered. 
2 Indicative Factors Considered Under a GAAR Analysis 
This part examines the way each jurisdiction deals with 
denotative factors. It is found that the inquiry under each GAAR is 
essentially the same in substance, despite different legislative 
wording. How each court employs and applies indicative factors 
under a GAAR analysis epitomises the similarities in approach and 
reveals that the material inquiry is the same.  
The approach of the United Kingdom is not considered in 
this part because the courts had not yet dealt with s 207 when this 
paper was written. 
B How Does the GAAR Allow For Factors to Be 
Considered? 
As discussed above, there are important limitations to the 
purposive approach. Importantly, an analysis under a general 
anti-avoidance provision takes the inquiry further than purposive 
construction, by allowing the courts to consider a wide range of 
factors that may not ordinarily be considered through purposive 
interpretation. 
Justice Rothstein explained the difference in Canada between 
purposive construction and a GAAR analysis in Copthorne. His 
Honour noted first that the purposive approach is the same 
interpretative approach employed by the court in all questions of 
statutory interpretation, however under a GAAR:104 
 
… the analysis seeks to determine a different aspect of 
the statute than in other cases. In a traditional statutory 
interpretation approach the court applies the textual, 
contextual and purposive analysis to determine what 
the words of the statute mean. In a GAAR analysis the 
textual, contextual and purposive analysis is employed 
to determine the object, spirit or purpose of a provision. 
Here the meaning of the words may be clear enough. 
  
104 Copthorne above n 41 at [70] – [71]. 
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The search for the rationale that underlies the words 
that may not be captured by the bare meaning of the 
words themselves. [Then], a court must consider 
whether the transaction falls within or frustrates the 
identified purpose. 
  
Here, one can see how under s 245 extra factors can be taken 
into account to determine if the transaction abused the statute as a 
whole.105 The Supreme Court of New Zealand has also 
emphasised the broad inquiry under s BG 1:106 
 
The general anti-avoidance provision does not 
confine the Court as to the matters which may be 
taken into account when considering whether a tax 
avoidance arrangement exists. Hence the 
Commissioner and the courts may address a number 
of relevant factors, the significance of which will 
depend on the particular facts. 
 
As mentioned, the Australian Part IVA lists a number of 
factors to consider when determining purpose, evidencing a clear 
legislative intention that the inquiry be broad in scope.  It should 
be mentioned that the High Court in Consolidated Press Holdings 
affirmed that it is not necessary for a judge to refer to the matters 
in 177D individually,107 rather a global assessment of purpose is 
appropriate, and often an examination of the reasons set out in a 
judgment will show that relevant matters were taken into 
account.108  
 
Critics wary of the scope of a GAAR claim that the same 
limits that apply to a purposive approach similarly apply to a 
GAAR analysis, that is, it should not be used “to make a law 
  
105 Income Tax Act 1988 (Can) s 245 
106 Ben Nevis above n 31 at [108]. 
107
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Press Holdings Ltd (200
1) 207 CLR 235 at [94] affirming the approach of Hill J in Spotless above n 22. 
108 Ibid. 
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consistent with Parliamentary intent if Parliament has failed to 
effectively state that intent in the statute.”109 The classic feature 
of tax avoidance arrangements is that they technically satisfy the 
specific words of the law, as enacted by parliament.110 However, 
through enacting a GAAR, Parliament has expressed their intent. A 
clear intention to combat tax avoidance. As Woodhouse P 
provided in Challenge of the then GAAR s 99:111 112 
 
 “Be that as it may s 99 is obviously a central pillar of 
the income legislation (to use the language of the 
counsel for Challenge in accepting the fact) and a 
reflection of the firm and understandable conclusion 
of Parliament that there must be a weapon able to 
thwart technically correct but contrived transactions 
set up as a means of exploiting the Act for tax 
advantages.” 
 
In order to give effect to such a weapon, the courts have, and 
rightly so, invoked indicative factors to aid their determination.  
 
C How the factors are used to draw the line 
Upon review of judicial approaches, it appears that each 
jurisdiction draws the line between mitigation and avoidance by 
reference to and use of denotative or suggestive factors.113 This 
paper proposes that these factors are at the core of each of the 
GAAR analyses, and that examining the use of them reveals that 
the substantive inquiry is essentially the same in each of our 
comparator jurisdictions. Examples of indicative factors include; 
artificiality, contrivance, pretence, undue complexity, the 
  
109 Kate Tokeley above n 61 at [969]. 
110 Challenge (PC) above n 58 at [559]; and (CA) at [533] 
111 Income Tax Act 1976 (NZ) s 99 (repealed) 
112 Challenge (CA) above n 58 at [532]. 
113 See Triad Gestco Ltd v The Queen [2012] FCA 258; [2012] DTC 5156, 
7385at [50]; and Ben Nevis above n 31 at [108]. Hart above n 22. 
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relationships of the parties involved, and many more factors 
identified and considered by courts in GAAR cases.  
 
Each jurisdiction uses the indicative factors at different 
stages of their GAAR analysis and to answer seemingly different 
questions. Canadian courts refer to factors to show an 
arrangement misuses provisions of the Act or is abusive. 
Australian courts use factors to conclude there is a dominant 
purpose of obtaining a tax benefit. In New Zealand, the courts 
refer to factors to show an arrangement was outside of 
parliament’s contemplation. Yet, in each case the considering of 
factors gives judges the tool they need to go beyond the normal 
rules of statutory construction.114 In substance, they are always 
used as decisive tools to draw the line between avoidance and 
mitigation 
 
Take the factor of ‘undue complexity’ for example. The 
courts in all three jurisdictions have used this factor to help 
determine whether tax avoidance exists.  
In Hart Callinan J interpreted s 177D(b)(ii), which directs 
the court to the form and substance of the scheme, 115  as 
requiring the court to ask, “whether the substance of the 
transaction (tax implications apart) could more conveniently, or 
commercially, or frugally have been achieved by a different 
transaction or form of transaction.”116 His Honour determined 
that it could, and used that factor, among others, to contribute to 
his finding of a dominant purpose, and in turn a finding of tax 
avoidance.  
 
In Copthorne the Supreme Court of Canada held that a 
vertical amalgamation would have been the simpler course of 
  
114 Judith Freedman, ‗Interpreting Tax Statutes: Tax Avoidance and the Intention of 
Parliament‘ (2007) 123 Law Quarterly Review 53, 81; as cited in Atkinson above n 
2. 
115 s177D(b)(ii) Income Tax Assessment Act (Austl) 
116 Hart above n 22 at [94] 
Victoria University LAWS 516 Taxation Research Paper “When It Comes to General Anti-
Avoidance Rules, Is Broader Better? 
 
39
action,117 and therefore concluded that the horizontal 
amalgamation was chosen because of the tax benefit. Although 
the text of the relevant provisions did not preclude a taxpayer 
from selecting the vertical option,118 Rothstein J determined that 
the choice of a horizontal amalgamation and its use here 
circumvented the words of the specific provisions,119 and 
frustrated and defeated the purpose of those provisions.120 In so 
finding, Rothstein J was able to conclude that the transactions 
were abusive, and accordingly avoidance per s 245. 121 
 
Finally, consider New Zealand’s use of the undue complexity 
indicator. In BNZ Investments Wild J dedicated a section of his 
analysis to the matter of complexity and concluded that there was 
an unusual level of complexity involved for transactions that are 
in substance straightforward loans, as in BNZ.122 In that case, 
complexity was one of many factors considered by Wild J in his 
application of the parliamentary contemplation test from Ben 
Nevis, and it contributed to his finding that the arrangements were 
not within parliaments contemplation, and were tax avoidance 
arrangements.123   
In each of these cases undue complexity was one of many 
factors referred to by the courts, but in each instance it was used 
to aid their determination of whether tax avoidance existed. 
1 Objection to considering factors when determining purpose 
The central criticism levied against considering factors when 
determining purpose is that the emphasis of a GAAR inquiry 
should not be on purpose. The argument goes; there is no 
  
117 Copthorne, above n 41 at [37] and [62]. 
118 At [126] 
119 At [124]. 
120 At [125]-[126]-[127]. 
121 The court considered many other indicative factors, undue complexity 
being one of many. See the full judgment of Copthorne above n 41for other 
factors considered. 
122 BNZ Investments v CIR (2009) 24 NZTC 23, 582 [BNZ Investments No 2 
(HC)] at [281]-[284] 
123 See BNZ Investments above n 122 generally, and at [526] 
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dichotomy between commercial and tax purposes –structuring to 
obtain a tax advantage is part of legitimate business and is itself 
an acceptable commercial purpose. However, through enacting a 
GAAR the legislature has indicated their view that, in certain 
circumstances, it is not an acceptable purpose. The courts now 
readily accept that in enacting a GAAR, parliament has expressed 
their intention to thwart contrived arrangements structured to gain 
tax advantages.124  
 
The fact that parliament has expressed their intention is not 
the only way to rebut the objection here; that is, the objection   to 
courts considering factors when determining purpose. Reviewing 
the substance of the inquiry in each jurisdiction reveals that when 
the courts give weight to certain factors they are embarking on 
essentially the same exercise, regardless of what element of the 
inquiry the court is addressing. The presence of artificiality or 
contrivance in an impugned arrangement can signal that there is a 
dominant purpose of obtaining a tax benefit, that the arrangement 
abuses the Act as a whole or that the arrangement used provisions 
in a manner outside of parliaments contemplation. The Supreme 
Court of New Zealand demonstrated this point well in Ben Nevis, 
where the same artificiality of the impugned arrangement was 
said to reveal tax avoidance was the ‘primary if not the sole’ 
purpose,125 and that the arrangement was not within parliaments 
purpose for the specific provisions.126  
 
To further illustrate this point, consider the essential factor 
from Penny and Hooper: the artificially low setting of salaries. If 
a taxpayer set their salary artificially low to take advantage of a 
lower company tax bracket, that artificiality logically indicates 
that the taxpayer had a purpose of obtaining a tax advantage, that 
  
124 See for example, Penny and Hooper above n 58 at [47]. 
125 Ben Nevis above n 31 at [122], note the merely incidental element of s BG 1 
was not discussed in depth in Ben Nevis as it was not relied on by the 
appellants (see [114]), however the artificiality of the promissory note was still 
said to demonstrate a primary purpose of avoidance at [122]. 
126 Ben Nevis above n 31 at [147] and [148]; and generally; see also [108]. 
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is why they accepted a lower salary. Identifying that artificiality 
also helps one conclude that the taxpayer has misused the 
provisions of the Act; by artificially decreasing my salary they 
are frustrating the object and purpose of the provisions which is 
to establish progressive tax rates and tax the reality of ones 
income. Finally as the court in Ben Nevis has outlined, it is not 
within Parliament’s intention that specific provisions be used to 
gain a tax benefit in an artificial manner.127 
 
The examples of undue complexity and artificiality evince 
that, while the questions are posed differently in each jurisdiction, 
the material inquiry is in essence the same; the indicative factors 
are used to aid the determination of whether tax avoidance exists, 
to draw the line between mitigation and avoidance. 
 
 
VIII The Danger of Enumeration 
A Factors – Should They Be Legislatively Enacted or 
Left to the Courts Discretion? 
Part IVA of Australia lists eight criteria to be considered by the 
courts. While not part of the comparison in this paper, it is 
noteworthy that South Africa, who had the benefit of learning 
from international experience, also chose to list indicative criteria 
(called tainted elements) in their GAAR when it was enacted in 
2006.128 It seems the United Kingdom, upon reviewing 
international practice, similarly decided a legislated list of criteria 
was beneficial, and preferable to judicial discretion.129 The 
Canadian GAAR does not contain specifications other than the 
positive abuse requirement addressed above. The New Zealand 
GAAR is definitely the most broadly drafted of the four 
comparators, containing no listed criteria, and as such is subject 
  
127 Ben Nevis above n 31 at [108]. 
128 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (S. Afr.) Part IIA s 80A – 80L. 
129 Finance Act 2013 (UK) s 207(20(a)-(c), 207(4)(a)-(c) and 207 (5). See also 
Aaronson Report above n 13 at [31]-[32] and the Illustrative GAAR at [42]-[54] 
and accompanying Guidance Note from [55]. 
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to some criticism for leaving too much in the hands of the 
court.130 
 
While enumerating a general anti-avoidance rule with lists of 
telling elements has the appearance of increasing certainty,131 
enumeration is also dangerous for a GAAR, which, for its very 
role, needs to be broad. Enumerating a GAAR risks narrowing a 
rule that works best when drafted in general terms.132 
1 Objection to non-legislated factors: 
Essentially, the arguments in favour of listing factors in 
legislation are aimed at the ever-present concern about certainty. 
It seems logical to assert that, where certainty is an ultimate goal, 
a GAAR with a misuse requirement and with objective factors 
contained within the legislation is preferable to leaving scope for 
judicial discretion.133 Certainty, however, is not an unqualified 
  
130 Atkinson above n 2 at [44], [50] and [56]; G. T. Pagone “General Anti 
Avoidance Provisions in Australia and New Zealand” (paper presented to 
Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners New Zealand Trust Conference, 
Auckland, 30 March 2012).at [30]-[31] and [37] (writing extra-judicially). And 
see Sam Davies “Seeking tax certainty: Is it time for a ‘new’ test for tax 
avoidance?’ (29 July 2013) Buddle Findlay 
 <http://www.buddlefindlay.com/article/2013/07/29/seeking-tax-certainty-is-it-
time-for-a-new-test-for-tax-avoidance>. 
131 John Prebble and Rebecca Prebble John Prebble and Rebecca Prebble 
“Chapter 4 Does the Use of General Anti Avoidance Rules to Combat Tax 
Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule of Law?” Victoria University 
<http://www.regulatorytoolkit.ac.nz/resources/papers/book-1/does-the-use-of-
general> at [4.5.3]. 
132 John Prebble John Prebble “Chapter 10 - General Anti-Avoidance Rules as 
Regulatory Rules of the Fiscal System: Suggestions for Improvement to the 




rule> at [10.1.3], see also Judith Freedman above n 12at [333] and [345]-
[353], [354]-[357]; and generally, where Freedman proposes an anti-avoidance 
principle, arguably more broad than an un-enumerated rule. See also Judith 
Freedman above n 24 at [388]-[390]. 
133 Atkinson above n 2 at [54] 
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good,134 and in some circumstances it should not be the 
overriding aim and is even undesirable.135 In any event, over-
specification in the GAAR context does not necessarily produce 
certainty, or rather more certainty than a general rule, and in any 
case, over-specification is not desirable.  
2 Enumeration does not create more certainty. 
The concept that enumeration does not create more certainty is 
not a simple one, and to discuss it in depth is beyond the scope of 
this paper. At surface level, however, it can be explained. Take, 
for example, the above comparisons of the use of artificiality and 
undue complexity by Australian and New Zealand courts. The 
factors were used in both countries, in exactly the same way, to 
determine whether tax avoidance existed. If the substantive 
inquiry is the same, despite Part IVA being more detailed, it 
cannot be said that the application of the GAAR in Australia is 
more certain. For the rule is being applied in the same way, and 
the line is being drawn in more or less the same place.  
 
Furthermore, neither factor (artificiality or undue 
complexity) is expressly enacted in s 177D(b) of Part IVA. 
However, the Australian courts still used them both to indicate an 
avoidance purpose and to determine that avoidance existed.136 If 
the courts will still always refer to those elements of an 
arrangement they consider relevant to their inquiry, and make 
logical conclusions by reference to the tainted elements they 
judge to be appropriate, enumeration arguably leads to less 
certainty. An Australian tax payer, who refers to the legislation 
before establishing a tax motivated scheme and relies on a literal 
and narrow construction of its terms, may find himself surprised 
when a judge conducts a broad inquiry and refers to elements not 
expressly enacted in s 177D, but which that judge logically 
considers relevant to their inquiry. 
  
134 John Prebble and Rebecca Prebble above n 131 at [4.4] and preceding 
discussion. 
135 Judith Freedman above n 12 at [333] 
136 See above discussion page 37-39. 
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In the words of Professor Prebble, when explaining the broad 
scope of New Zealand’s s BG 1, “Parliament has left these areas 
for the courts for very good reason. They are simply not 
amenable to detailed legislation.”137  
 
The next part of this paper focuses on the idea that 
enumeration is undesirable in the GAAR context. While 
specification may not even serve to achieve its goal of producing 
certainty, even if it did, fleshing out a GAAR is objectionable for 
other reasons.  
B Enumeration is Undesirable 
1 Judicial Discretion is not so offensive as it seems: 
All four comparators in this paper are Common Law jurisdictions 
and as such are no strangers to judicially developed doctrines and 
principles. Many areas of commercial law involve vague or 
uncertain concepts which are applied by the courts to govern 
rights and obligations.138 The duty to act in good faith in contract 
law for example can override the literal language of a contract.139 
Within tax law itself the concepts of income and capital are far 
from certain.140 A GAAR provision is not the only uncertain aspect 
of a legal system and not even of tax law. Yet it is subject to 
much criticism for its imprecise nature and for placing too much 
power in the hands of the court.141 In light of these 
considerations, it seems general anti-avoidance provisions are 
held to higher standards of certainty than other areas of law.142 
  
137 John Prebble above n 132 at [10.4.2] 
138 Judith Freedman above n 12 at [346]. See also Kate Tokeley above n 61 at 
[966]. See also Weisbach above n 15 at [875]-[876].  
139 David Weisbach above n 15 at [884]-[885].  
140 Judith Freedman above n 12 at [347]. 
141 Atkinson above n 2 at [44]; see also Tax Avoidance Working Group 
Improving the Operation of New Zealand’s Tax Avoidance Laws (November 
2011); and see Brian M Studniberg “Minding the Gap in Tax Interpretation: 
Does Specificity Oust the General Anti-Avoidance Rule Post-Copthorne” 
(2012) 38 Queen’s Law Journal 209. 
142 Weisbach at above n 15. 
Victoria University LAWS 516 Taxation Research Paper “When It Comes to General Anti-
Avoidance Rules, Is Broader Better? 
 
45
This inconsistency is likely attributable to the old view that 
taxpayers are free to construct their affairs to minimise tax, so 
long as they comply with the literal meaning of the law as 
enacted,143 and the creative compliance culture that in turn 
resulted.144 However, that view has long since been quashed. 
Statutory GAARs are express proof that parliaments reject this 
view.145  
 
Given that each of the comparators are jurisdictions that 
strive for strict adherence to the rule of law; any departure from 
its requirements, in this case certainty, must surely be considered 
necessary. The authors of “Does the Use of General Anti-
Avoidance Rules to Combat Tax Avoidance Breach the Rule of 
Law? A Comparative Study” concluded that the broad nature of a 
GAAR does indeed amount to a breach of the rule of law.146 
However, the authors found the breach was justifiable,147 as it 
seems has each parliament who has enacted a statutory GAAR. 
Moreover, as a catch-all provision charged with the task of 
protecting the revenue gathering ability of the government its 
wide reach is important. As Prebble succinctly put it, highlighting 
the principle obstacle for any general anti-avoidance provision, 
creative compliance: “In order to respond to the many possible 
ways in which people can arrange their taxation and business, it 
is necessary to have a rule of very broad scope.” 148 Hence, it 
seems while a high level of uncertainty is involved in general 
anti-avoidance provisions, uncertainty in the law is not unheard 
of, and can be justified. 
  
143 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminster HL [1936] AC 1.; 
see also Alan Gunn “Tax Avoidance” (1978) 76 Mich L Rev 733, as cited in 
Weisbach above n 15 at [862] and accompanying text at [862]. 
144 Weisbach above n 15 at [870]; see also Judith Freedman above n 24. 
145 See for example the HMRC Guideline’s, above n 90, express instruction 
that the Duke of Westminster principle is dead at [5]. 
146 Rebecca Prebble and John Prebble “Does the Use of General Anti-
Avoidance Rules to Combat Tax Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule of 
Law?” 2 VUWLRP 8/2012 21.; and John Prebble above n 132 at [10.1.3]. 
147 Rebecca Prebble and John Prebble above n 146 at [35]-[45]. 
148 John Prebble above n 132 [10.1.3] 
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2 The Main Point: General anti-avoidance rules are broad on 
purpose.  
If one of the strengths of a general anti-avoidance rule is its 
indeterminacy and broad scope, attempting to make it more 
detailed seems counterproductive.149 As Woodhouse P explained 
of the New Zealand provision in Challenge:150  
 
“There can be no doubt that when the provision was 
amplified and given its present statutory form by 
Parliament in 1974 the deliberate decision was then 
taken that, because the problem of definition in this 
elusive field could not be met by expressly spelling 
out a series of detailed specifications in the Statute 
itself, the interstices must be left for attention by the 
judges. Indeed during the legislative process of 
examining the proposed new section an amendment 
was proffered at the committee stage which might 
have given some added detail but was rejected as 
unacceptable.” 
 
The New Zealand Parliament has had numerous 
opportunities to add detail to the GAAR and has received 
much pressure to do so,151 yet on each occasion it has 
declined.152 The Australian Parliament, rather than amend 
  
149 John Prebble and Rebecca Prebble above n 131 at 4.5.5 and 
see generally John Prebble “Practical Problems from Publication of the 
Commissioner’s Interpretation Guidelines” (Working Paper Series: Working 
Paper No. 8) < http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/cagtr/working-
papers/WP08.pdf>. 
150 Challenge Corporation above n 58 at [534] 
151 John Prebble above n 149 at [20] and John Prebble above n 132 at [10.4.1] 
speaking of the pressure even on the Commissioner to flesh out the general 
rule.  
152 John Prebble above n 149 at [20] and Rebecca and John Prebble above n 
131 at [4.5.3] 
Victoria University LAWS 516 Taxation Research Paper “When It Comes to General Anti-
Avoidance Rules, Is Broader Better? 
 
47
Part IVA to confine its scope, has chosen to act only to 
ensure its terms are applied broadly.153 
3 The Dangers of Enumeration: 
Expressio Unius or Implied Exclusion 
Enacting lists of set criteria for the courts to consider risks 
important indicia being overlooked down the line, or too much 
weight being placed on those criteria so enacted. Expressio unius 
est exclusion alterius (the expression of one is the exclusion of 
others) may be an old rule of interpretation but it is far from dead. 
Rothstein J referenced the principle in Copthorne when he 
accepted the taxpayer’s submission that a relevant defining 
provision in the statute was exhaustive.154 If a GAAR lists tainted 
elements and that list was found to be exhaustive, the scope of the 
GAAR would be significantly narrowed. Admittedly, there are 
protections against such an extreme conclusion. The United 
Kingdom GAAR for example expressly states that the lists of 
indicia are not intended to be exhaustive.155 Of similar effect, is 
the approach of the Australian courts in that they have not viewed 
the eight factors in s 177D(b) narrowly.156  
 
However, the unconscious impact of legislated criteria can be 
more damaging. Short of holding a factor impliedly excluded 
from the inquiry, a court may place extra emphasis on expressly 
legislated criteria or let the criteria that have been enacted colour 
their entire approach. For example, while a court in the United 
  
153 Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance and Multinational 
Profit) Act 2013 (Cth) (Austl.) and see Tax Laws Amendment (Countering 
Tax Avoidance And Multinational Profit Sharing) Bill 2013 Explanatory 
Memorandum (Australia). 
154 Copthorne, above n 41 at [108] – [111]. 
155 Finance Act 2013 (UK) s 207(6) 
156 s 177D(b) Income Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (Austl); and see above at 
pages 37-39 where it was held in Hart that the form and substance factor from 
s 177D(b)(ii) was held to include an inquiry into not just whether the actual 
substance of the scheme matched the legal form but also whether the scheme 
could have been more frugally achieved by other means. 
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Kingdom would acknowledge that the list of factors is not 
exhaustive,157 it may, even unintentionally, only consider other 
criteria which seem to be in the same class as the factors that are 
legislated. For example, while the High Court of Australia in 
Hart asked whether the scheme could have more frugally been 
achieved by other means, it justified asking that question by 
reference to one of the listed criteria.158 
 
 Creative Compliance 
Creative compliance is an established practice in taxation. Every 
jurisdiction experiences it even when they have a GAAR. The 
formalistic and technical nature of tax law feeds creative 
compliance, as paths are drawn through detailed legislation.159 To 
enumerate and add specifications to the very rule aimed at 
countering creative compliance is inappropriate. As Freedman 
explains:160 
When it comes to the distinction between tax 
avoidance [and mitigation] … the measure of 
‘certainty’ achieved by formalism is not desirable 
since this leads to “creative compliance”.  
… [T]he production of ever more detailed rules 
simply encourages avoidance, or creative compliance, 
by the manipulation of those rules … using the rules 
themselves as signposts as to how to achieve the 
effective avoidance. … These observations result in 
the conclusion that what we need is not more precise 
and detailed avoidance provisions. 
 
  
157 As per s 207(6) Finance Act 2013. 
158 See above n 120 and accompanying text. 
159 Doreen McBarnet and Christopher Whelan “The Elusive Spirit of the Law: 
Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control” (1991) 54 The Modern Law 
Review 848, at [848], [849] and generally; see also John Braithwaite “Rules 
and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty” (2002) 27 Australian Journal of 
Legal Philosophy 47, at [53] and [57]. 
160 Freedman above n 12 at [346]. 
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Freedman concludes from her observations about creative 
compliance that what is not needed is more precise and detailed 
avoidance provisions.161  
 
This paper agrees with that proposition. A gear provides 
direction to the court by demonstrating a clear intention that 
Parliament wishes to counter tax avoidance. A broadly drafted 
rule ensures all arrangements are capable of being subject to the 
gear. Moreover a broad rule does not open itself up to abuse and 
manipulation which can undermine its operation.  
A government cannot predict every arrangement or situation 
when it comes to the sophisticated and technical world of tax but 
what they can do is enact a broad rule, with a clear function of 
countering tax avoidance to foster a broad judicial approach and 
enable the courts use of indicative factors not normally resorted 
to in mere purposive interpretation. The following final example 
reveals the unfortunate complications Australia has faced as a 
result of adding detail to their Part IVA. 
 
C Enumeration Gone Wrong – Identifying a 
Counterfactual 
The Australian experience with general anti-avoidance provisions 
provides an unfortunate but excellent example of the danger of 
adding detail in the GAAR context. Enumeration and 
specifications have seen the GAAR in Australia be bogged down 
by arbitrary litigation and lines of argument that effectively 
emasculate its terms. Australia’s current gear was a response to a 
judicial attitude that had rendered the old s 260 almost useless.162 
This background contributed to the decision by Parliament to add 
  
161 Judith Freedman above n 12 at [353]. 
162 John Prebble and Rebecca Prebble above n 131 at [4.2.5] and [4.5.3] and 
see Christine Barron, General Manager of Corporate and International Tax 
Division, Australian Treasury, “Anti-Avoidance Rules in Taxation: Striking a 
Balance” (speech to the Asian Tax Authorities Symposium, Kuala Lumpur, 4 
September 2012) 
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detail to the terms of Part IVA, in the hope that a clear legislative 
intent expressed in precise rules would not be able to be read 
down as its predecessor was. However while detailed terms have 
the appearance of adding certainty and direction, they also add 
complexity and open up the provision to arbitrary litigation.  
The first serious debate concerning the operation of Part IVA 
concerned the role of the scheme identified by the 
Commissioner.163 Part IVA requires the dominant purpose was to 
obtain the tax benefit in connection with the scheme.164 The Full 
Court in Peabody found that, because the Commissioner had 
identified the scheme widely, the dominant purpose of the wider 
scheme was of a commercial nature and was not to enable the 
taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit.165 The Commissioner responded 
arguing that the provisions of Part IVA do not only cover a 
scheme but any part of a scheme,166 hence if the taxpayer’s 
dominant purpose for part of the scheme was to obtain a tax 
benefit then it was within the meaning of Part IVA.167 The High 
Court did not agree that a scheme under Part IVA included part 
of a scheme and any circumstances incapable of standing on their 
own without being ‘robbed of all practical meaning’ would not 
constitute a scheme under Part IVA.168 That passage provided the 
foundation for later arguments that circumstances identified by 
the Commissioner as schemes could not be subject to Part IVA if 
they were incapable of standing on their own without being 
robbed of all practical meaning.169 Ten years later in Hart, their 
Honours explained that it was an error to treat the comments from 
Peabody as “a criterion which must be applied in deciding 
whether there is a scheme to which Part IVA applies.” Now the 
  
163 Pagone above n 130 at [14]. 
164 s 177A(5) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (Austl) (emphasis 
added). 
165 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Peabody (1994) 181 CLR 359.   (HC) 
at [383]. 
166 Relying on s 177A(5) and 177D Income Tax Assessment Act (cth) (Austl) 
see Peabody above n 165 at [383]. 
167 Peabody above n 165 at [383]. 
168 Peabody above n 165 at [384]-[385]. 
169 Pagone above n 130  at [16]. 
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Commissioner in Australia may identify a scheme very narrowly 
to overcome the dominant purpose requirement. In this way, the 
identification of a scheme by the Commissioner has lost some of 
its significance but as Pagone stated, writing extra-judicially, “the 
effect of Peabody was not without cost and uncertainty.”170 
 
Another, arguably more serious example of the effects of a 
detailed gear is the Australian approach to identifying a tax 
benefit.. Section 177C sets out when a tax benefit is be subject to 
Part IVA. The relevant part of the provision provides:171  
 
(1) Subject to this section, a reference in this Part to the 
obtaining by a taxpayer of a tax benefit in connection with 
a scheme shall be read as a reference to: 
(a) an amount not being included in the assessable 
income of the taxpayer of a year of income where that 
amount would have been included, or might 
reasonably be expected to have been included, in the 
assessable income of the taxpayer of that year of 
income if the scheme had not been entered into or 
carried out; 
 
Section 177 (b), (ba), (bb) and (bc) are similar paragraphs 
concerning deductions, capital loss, foreign income tax offset and 
withholding tax, however it is the italicised words that are 
important for the purposes of this part. Those words have been 
said to require a consideration of what the scheme produced and a 
comparison with an alternative postulate, or counterfactual.172 
Indeed, the Australian government has said that the Part IVA 
inquiry implicitly requires a comparison between the scheme in 
question and an alternative postulate.173  
  
170 Pagone above n 130 at [16]. 
171 Part IVA s 177C(1)(a) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (Austl) 
(emphasis added). 
172 Pagone above n 130 Hart at [66]. 
173 Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance And Multinational 
Profit Sharing) Bill 2013 Explanatory Memorandum (Australia). 
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At first instance the need to consider a comparison does not 
seem extraordinary, or indeed harmful. It seems logical that a 
comparison sometimes be used under a GAAR analysis, as the 
Supreme Court of Canada explained in Canada Trustco:174  
If a deduction against taxable income is claimed, the 
existence of a tax benefit is clear, since a deduction 
results in a reduction of tax. In some other instances, 
it may be that the existence of a tax benefit can only 
be established by comparison with an alternative 
arrangement. For example characterization of an 
amount as an annuity rather than as a wage, or as a 
capital gain rather than as business income, will result 
in differential tax treatment. 
 
The Canadian courts often identify a tax benefit by 
comparing the impugned transaction to what ‘might reasonably 
have been carried out but for the existence of the tax benefit,’175 
such a comparison contributes not only to a finding of a tax 
benefit but also a purpose of obtaining that benefit and even 
whether there was an abuse of the Act.  
 
As discussed above, in Copthorne the Supreme Court of 
Canada considered that a vertical amalgamation would have been 
simpler. The taxpayer in that case argued that they would never 
have chosen a vertical amalgamation because of the higher 
liability to tax, which made it an unreasonable choice, and thus 
there was no tax benefit. The Court held, however, that, but for 
the difference in tax, a vertical amalgamation was a reasonable 
option,176 emphasising that a vertical amalgamation would have 
produced the same non-tax consequences and benefits.177 As the 
use of a vertical amalgamation frustrated the purpose of the 
  
174 Canada Trustco above n 39 at [20]. 
175 Copthorne above n 41; Canada Trustco above n 39 at [20]; and Canadian 
Pacific Ltd v The Queen 2000 DTC 2428 [2001] 1 CTC 2190 (TCC). 
176 Copthorne above n 41 per Rothstein J at [37]. 
177 Copthorne above n 41 per Rothstein J at [62]. 
Victoria University LAWS 516 Taxation Research Paper “When It Comes to General Anti-
Avoidance Rules, Is Broader Better? 
 
53
specific provisions, the court found the transaction was abusive 
avoidance,178 and concluded the Commissioner’s reassessment of 
liability to tax based on a horizontal amalgamation was correct.  
 
Historically, the counterfactual element of the Part IVA 
inquiry has proceeded similarly to the example from Copthorne. 
The proposed counterfactual was based on the idea that the 
taxpayer would have done something other than the impugned 
transaction in order to achieve a similar business outcome.179 
That is, tax implications apart, the results of the transactions were 
considered part of what the hypothetical postulate must 
produce.180  
 
However, in a number of cases from the early 2010’s 
taxpayers argued successfully that they did not obtain a tax 
benefit at all,181 because without the scheme they would not have 
entered into an arrangement that attracted tax.182  Rather, they 
would have entered into another scheme that avoided tax, or they 
would have done nothing at all.183 In RCI Pty Ltd the Australian 
Full Court accepted the argument that a company would not have 
disposed of its shares if it had had to pay tax on the transaction. 
That is, it would not have done anything. As no tax would have 
been payable on maintaining ownership of the shares, there was 
no tax benefit from the arrangement that did not occur.184 In this 
  
178 Copthorne above n 41 at [124] – [127]  
179 Christine Barron, General Manager of Corporate and International Tax 
Division, Australian Treasury, “Anti-Avoidance Rules in Taxation: Striking a 
Balance” (speech to the Asian Tax Authorities Symposium, Kuala Lumpur, 4 
September 2012), see for example Hart above n 22, Spotless above n 22 and 
Peabody above n 165. 
180 Barron above n 179 and Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance 
And Multinational Profit Sharing) Bill 2013 Explanatory Memorandum 
(Australia). 
181 RCI Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCAFC 104; and 
Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd [2012] FCAFC 32 
182 Barron above n 179 and Explanatory Memorandum above n 180. 
183 Barron above n 179. 
184 RCI Pty Ltd above n 181 and Barron above n 179. 
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way, it was not held to be necessary that the counterfactual 
scenario produce any of the other business outcomes of the 
impugned scheme.  
 
Such an approach could potentially undermine the 
effectiveness of Part IVA entirely. In response the Government 
has had to amend Part IVA to ensure an alternative postulate 
comprises existing facts and circumstances minus the tax scheme 
itself,185 to ensure that when determining whether a 
counterfactual is a reasonable alternative regard should be had to 
the substance of the scheme and not to the tax cost of the scheme 
or to the tax consequences of the counterfactual. This 
complication is almost wholly attributable to the detailed form of 
Part IVA. In adding seemingly harmless words such as ‘would 
have been or might reasonably be expected to have been … had 
the scheme not been entered into or carried out’ the Australian 
government opened Part IVA up to circumvention. The 
counterfactual experience of Australia is a prime example of over 
specification leading ultimately to complication and a narrowing 
of the scope of a GAAR.   
 
  
185 Explanatory Memorandum above n 180. 
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This paper examines the proposition that general anti-avoidance 
rules achieve their purpose better when drafted in broad terms. 
Several jurisdictions have included misuse and abuse 
requirements in their GAARs in order to provide certainty and a 
high threshold for the GAAR’s operation. Others have enumerated 
their GAAR to add precision and certainty to its terms. Notably, 
the United Kingdom after watching other jurisdictions deal with 
their general anti avoidance provisions for decades chose to do 
both, that is to include a misuse/abuse requirement and to add 
detail to their gear through the inclusion of legislated indicative 
factors.  
While misuse and abuse requirements and enumeration have the 
appearance of adding precision to an uncertain area of law, in 
practice this is doubtful. The general anti-avoidance provisions of 
four jurisdictions were compared, namely Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The comparison of 
approaches undertaken by each of the Canadian and New Zealand 
courts revealed that the inquiry was materially the same. 
Interestingly, Oxford dictionary defines misuse as the use of 
something “in the wrong way or for the wrong purpose”. At the 
risk of oversimplification, is it not essentially the same thing to 
ask whether an arrangement misuses provisions as to ask whether 
an arrangement uses a provision for an unintended purpose? 
Finally this paper compared GAARs of the broad spectrum (for 
example Canada and New Zealand’s) to Australia’s more detailed 
provision, and found that the detail added to Part IVA in an 
attempt to create certainty, did not transform the fundamental 
inquiry of the courts and rather brought undesirable complexity to 
an already complex area of law, creating arbitrary litigation and 
ultimately serving to undermine the provision. 
 
 The comparisons in this paper served to demonstrate two 
central points, which in turn both contribute to one main 
proposition.  
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1 An abuse/misuse requirement does not fundamentally alter 
the material inquiry under a GAAR. 
2 Adding detail to a GAAR also does not fundamentally alter 
the inquiry and actually does more harm than good. 
 
These two points, made by way of comparison, both contribute to 
the central proposition of this paper that GAARs work best when 
drafted in broad terms. 
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